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On August 17, 2006, President Bush signed the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) 
into law, following its passage by both houses of Congress in a strong showing of bipartisan 
support.
1 This law, probably the most sweeping piece of pension reform legislation since the 
Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), contains many different 
pension reform provisions.
2 In this paper, we focus on a subset of measures within the PPA 
adopted specifically to promote better savings outcomes in defined contribution savings plans. 
 
   The push for these provisions came in response to a growing body of economic research 
showing first, that many individuals are not saving enough for retirement (despite a stated desire 
to save more), and second, that many individuals are largely passive in their retirement savings 
behavior. The “autosave” features encouraged in the Pension Protection Act aim to harness the 
power of inertia to increase employee savings—if employees do nothing, the result will be that 
they are saving rather than that they are not.  
 
This paper first summarizes the autosave features of the PPA, then describes the 
economic research that motivates them, and finally discusses how this research was translated 
into policy. 
 
The Autosave Features of the Pension Protection Act 
 
The Pension Protection Act promotes employer adoption of some or all of the following 
“autosave” features in their defined contribution savings plans: 
•  Automatic enrollment—employees are automatically enrolled in the savings plan at a 
default contribution rate and default asset allocation unless they explicitly choose to 
opt out. 
•  Employer contribution—the employer makes a contribution to employee accounts, 
either on a non-contingent basis (independent of whether employees contribute 
anything) or as a match on employee contributions.  
•  Contribution escalation—participant contributions to the savings plan automatically 
increase over time. 
•  Qualified default investment alternative (QDIA)—contributions are defaulted into a 
diversified portfolio that includes exposure to both equity and fixed income assets. 
 
The encouragement for employers to incorporate these features into their savings plans 
comes in several different forms. Although many employers recognized the potential benefit to 
employees of autopilot savings plans well before the PPA, some were reticent to adopt these 
features because of various legal concerns. PPA eliminated the legal underbrush on which many 
employer objections had rested. 
 
One such legal issue was an employer’s potential liability for investment losses in the 
default fund under automatic enrollment. ERISA (section 404(c)) affords employers relief from 
legal liability for losses resulting when participants in employer-sponsored savings plans direct 
                                                 
1 The bill was passed by the Senate in a 93-5 vote and by the House of Representatives in a 279-131 vote.  
2 See the U.S. Department of Labor’s pension reform website for more details on the Pension Protection Act 
(including the complete text of the 393-page act): http://www.dol.gov/EBSA/pensionreform.html.  
  2the asset allocation of their investments themselves. PPA extends this protection to default 
investments under automatic enrollment (and in other circumstances when participants fail to 
make an explicit asset allocation election) if these defaults satisfy certain requirements, including 
exposure to more than one asset class.
3
 
Finally, plans that adopt automatic enrollment with automatic contribution escalation
4 
and a sufficiently generous employer contribution
5 are exempted from annual non-discrimination 
testing. The non-discrimination tests are regulations designed to ensure that the tax benefits of 
savings plan participation do not accrue disproportionately to “highly compensated” employees. 
To pass the non-discrimination tests, firms must demonstrate that the participation and savings 
rates of employees with compensation below the “highly compensated” income limit are 
sufficiently high relative to employees whose incomes are above the threshold.
6 Demonstrating 
compliance is costly to employers, and there are additional costs associated with restructuring 
savings plans to achieve compliance in the event that a firm would not otherwise pass. If 
employers adopt conforming autosave features, they are exempt from having to demonstrate 
compliance. More generally, the exemption sends a signal to firms about what the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) and the Department of Labor (DOL), which jointly regulate employee 
benefit plans, deem to be acceptable and encouraged plan design features. 
 
The Economic Research Behind the Autosave Features of the Pension Protection Act 
 
Understanding the significance of these Pension Protection Act provisions requires some 
historical context. Until the 1970s, most employers who provided retirement income benefits for 
their workers did so using traditional defined benefit pension plans. In 1975, there were 2.4 
participants in defined benefit pension plans for every one participant in a defined contribution 
plan (Department of Labor, 2007). In the 1980s, however, the pension landscape began to 
change, precipitated by a series of new laws and regulations starting with the 1974 passage of 
ERISA. This act made it more costly for employers to offer traditional defined benefit pension 
plans to their workers. ERISA was followed by the addition of section 401(k) to the Internal 
Revenue Code in 1978. In 1981, an IRS clarification of the definition of taxable income allowed 
employers to exempt contributions to 401(k) savings plans from taxable income.  
 
Although the 1978 legislation and the 1981 clarification were not intended to transform 
the U.S. pension landscape, this is in fact what ensued. Section 401(k) gave firms a tax-favored 
option for providing retirement income benefits at a lower regulatory cost than that of traditional 
                                                 
3 These Qualified Default Investment Alternative (QDIA) regulations specifically endorse three different long-term 
investment options: life cycle or target retirement date funds, balanced funds, and professionally managed accounts 
(see http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsQDIA.pdf and http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fedreg/final/07-5147.pdf).  
4 The default contribution rate must be 3% or higher initially, and then escalate by 1% each year until reaching a rate 
of at least 6% and no more than 10%. Contribution escalation can presumably continue beyond the 10% level with a 
participant’s affirmative election. 
5 Employers can choose either a non-contingent contribution of 3% of pay for all employees (regardless of whether 
the employees choose to contribute themselves) or an employer match of 100% on the first 1% of pay contributed to 
the plan and 50% on further contributions up to 6% of pay (for a total matching contribution of 3.5% of pay if 
employees contribute at least 6% of their pay to the plan). A more generous non-contingent contribution or 
employer match is also acceptable. 
6 The income threshold for classification as a “highly compensated employee” has increased over time, and is set at 
$105,000 for 2008. 
  3defined benefit pensions in the post-ERISA environment. The 401(k) plan, originally intended as 
a supplemental savings vehicle, caused a complete upheaval of the employer-provided pension 
plan system. By the mid-1980s, both the number of defined benefit pension plans and the 
number of participants in these plans had started a steady (and ongoing) decline. Defined 
contribution savings plans—principally the 401(k) and its close cousins, the 403(b) and 457 
plans —filled the breach. In 2004, the latest year for which data are available, defined 
contribution participants outnumbered defined benefit participants by a ratio of 2.5 to one, a 
complete reversal of the situation thirty years earlier (Department of Labor, 2007). 
 
Employers initially adopted a “Field of Dreams” approach to defined contribution 
savings plans in this new era: if we offer it, they will save. The initial philosophy was that 
individuals know what savings outcomes are in their best interest and will achieve these 
outcomes through their savings plan choices. The hallmark of this first generation of defined 
contribution savings plans was choice: individuals choose whether or not to participate, how 
much to save, and how to allocate their assets. 
 
The foundations underlying this presumption began to crumble as research uncovered 
how poorly employees were actually utilizing defined contribution savings plans. In a series of 
surveys conducted periodically from 1991 to 2004, John Hancock Financial Services 
documented a striking lack of financial knowledge among defined contribution plan participants. 
In the most recent published version of the survey, 38% of respondents claimed that they had 
little or no investment knowledge, and two-thirds reported that they would be better off working 
with a financial advisor than managing their retirement investments on their own (John Hancock 
Financial Services, 2002). This self-perceived lack of expertise is corroborated by more objective 
measures of financial knowledge (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2007; Lusardi and Mitchell, 
2006).  
 
Financial ignorance need not be a problem if individuals can obtain reliable advice from 
those who are more knowledgeable, and then expeditiously implement that advice. In the age of 
defined benefit pension plans, employers filled the role of a (paternalistic) retirement savings 
advisor. Employers performed the complicated calculations required to determine how much 
money to set aside today to achieve the wealth needed to maintain consumption in retirement; 
employers contributed this amount to the pension plan without any active intervention by 
employees; and employers were responsible for managing the pension asset allocation. All of 
these tasks were done with the help of financial professionals. But in the transition from defined 
benefit to defined contribution savings plans, many employers stepped out of this paternalistic 
role. 
 
Strong evidence of the poor personal financial management that ensued comes from 
research on savings outcomes under automatic enrollment (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi, 
Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2002, 2004 and 2006; Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 
2008). Most defined contribution savings plans have historically required employees to 
proactively enroll in order to initiate participation. As part of the enrollment process, employees 
choose a contribution rate and an asset allocation. In contrast, under automatic enrollment, 
employees are enrolled in the plan at a contribution rate and asset allocation pre-specified by the 
employer unless they either explicitly opt out of participation or choose a different contribution 
  4rate and/or asset allocation. Automatic enrollment does not alter the set of options available to 
employees. It simply replaces one default (non-participation) with another (participation at a 
particular contribution rate and asset allocation). But this seemingly small procedural change 
generates significant differences in savings outcomes. 
 
  Figure 1 shows the relationship between employee tenure (the x-axis) and savings plan 
participation rates (the y-axis) at a large chemicals firm for three groups of employees: those 
hired before automatic enrollment was introduced, those hired under automatic enrollment with a 
default contribution rate of 3% of pay, and those hired under automatic enrollment with a default 
contribution rate of 6% of pay. There is a large difference in participation rates between those 
hired before and those hired after automatic enrollment. Participation rates prior to automatic 
enrollment start below 50% for newly hired employees and gradually increase to about 75% for 
those with more than two years of tenure. In contrast, participation rates for employees hired 
after automatic enrollment exceed 90% once employees who do not opt out have been swept into 
the savings plan in their third month of employment. The participation rate under automatic 
enrollment does not appear to depend on whether the default contribution rate is 3% or 6%.  
 
These differences are particularly surprising given the low costs of implementing a 
change in participation status. In survey responses, employees who have signed up for their 
employer’s savings plan report that doing so took about an hour and a half; employees who have 
not signed up estimate that it would take them a similar amount of time (Choi, Laibson, and 
Madrian, 2007). These time costs are modest compared to the substantial financial consequences 
of participation, the largest of which is the employer matching contribution (for example, the 
company in Figure 1 offers a dollar-for-dollar match on employee contributions up to 6% of 
pay). Other benefits include favorable tax treatment and higher future consumption (which must 
be weighed against the cost of decreased current consumption). 
 
  It is not clear which of the tenure-participation profiles in Figure 1 most closely reflects 
the true savings preferences of employees. Other evidence, however, leads us to the conclusion 
that most employees prefer to be saving early in their tenure. First, the opt-out rate under 
automatic enrollment is low (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 
2002 and 2006). Most of those who opt out do so almost immediately; few employees who are 
automatically enrolled later decide that they would rather not be contributing to the savings plan. 
In contrast, when the default is non-participation, the rate at which employees opt into savings 
plan participation is initially high and persistently positive, even after several years. Second, 
when employees are required to make an active “in-or-out” savings plan participation decision 
around 70% of employees choose to join the plan (Carroll et al., 2007). In addition, when asked, 
most employees state a preference to save more than they currently are (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, 
and Metrick, 2002 and 2006; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Bernheim, 1995; Farkas and Johnson, 
1997). Finally, a 2007 Harris Interactive poll finds that 98% of plan participants who were 
enrolled under automatic enrollment and did not opt out agree with the statement that “You are 
glad your company offers automatic enrollment.”  More surprisingly, 79% of the employees who 
did opt out of the savings plan also agree.  These various pieces of evidence suggest that most 
employees prefer to be participating in their employer-sponsored savings plan and that automatic 
enrollment is a useful mechanism for expediting enrollment. Hence, there is a strong rationale for 
encouraging employer adoption of automatic enrollment through the Pension Protection Act. 
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Automatic enrollment affects not only participation status, but also contribution rates and 
asset allocation. Figure 2 shows the distribution of contribution rates for participants at a large 
food company before automatic enrollment, under automatic enrollment with a 3% default 
contribution rate, and under automatic enrollment with a 4% default contribution rate.
7 Like the 
company shown in Figure 1, this company provides a match on employee contributions up to 6% 
of pay. Before automatic enrollment, 84% of participants elected to contribute at or above the 
6% match threshold, and very few had a contribution rate of 3% or 4%. Automatic enrollment 
dramatically shifts the distribution of contribution rates. When the default contribution rate is 
3%, almost half of participants have a 3% contribution rate; when the default contribution rate is 
4%, almost half have a 4% contribution rate. Under both automatic enrollment regimes, less than 
half of participants contribute at or above the match threshold—substantially fewer than the 84% 
at or above the threshold before automatic enrollment. The distribution of asset allocations, not 
shown in Figure 1, exhibits a similarly large shift towards the default asset allocation.  
 
The default effect is not only large initially, but it persists for a long time. Figure 3 shows 
the relationship between tenure and the probability of retaining both the default asset allocation 
and default contribution rate at four companies with automatic enrollment. The fraction of 
participants at these defaults is initially very high but declines with tenure as participants begin 
to elect their own contribution rates and asset allocations. Despite this decline, a large fraction of 
participants remains at the default even at high levels of tenure (e.g. over three years). Although 
not shown in Figure 3, the default asset allocation is slightly more persistent than the default 
contribution rate. 
 
Figure 3 understates the persistence of the default asset allocation in one important 
dimension. Even when automatically enrolled participants trade out of the default fund, their new 
asset allocation tends to be closer to the default than the asset allocations chosen by participants 
who were hired before automatic enrollment (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Beshears, Choi, Laibson, 
and Madrian, 2008). The reason for this persistence may be that employees perceive the default 
as having been implicitly endorsed by the employer. This endorsement effect also appears after a 
company adopts automatic enrollment, in the form of higher allocations to the default fund 
among participants who were not themselves subject to automatic enrollment (because they were 
hired before automatic enrollment was implemented).
8
 
Of course, the outcome that matters most is asset accumulation, which depends on all of 
the variables discussed above: participation, contribution rates, and asset allocation. On this 
front, automatic enrollment can be a two-edged sword. Automatic enrollment clearly increases 
asset accumulation (at least within the savings plan) for employees who would not have 
participated otherwise. But how does it affect asset accumulation for employees who would have 
                                                 
7 Because of concurrent 401(k) eligibility changes for employees under the age of 40 at this company, we restrict the 
analysis to employees aged 40 or over at the time of hire. These employees were immediately eligible to participate 
in the 401(k) plan both before and after the switch to automatic enrollment. 
8 A similar endorsement effect may influence employee allocations to employer stock, which are higher in firms that 
direct the employer match into employer stock than in firms where employer stock is simply available as an 
investment option (Benartzi, 2001; Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner, 2007). 
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to what employees would have chosen in the absence of automatic enrollment.  
 
Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2004) show that for some employees who would 
have participated in the absence of automatic enrollment, there is no effect on asset 
accumulation: these employees opt out of the automatic enrollment defaults early on and choose 
the same contribution rate and asset allocation that they would have chosen without automatic 
enrollment. But other employees are heavily influenced by the automatic enrollment defaults. 
Automatic enrollment raises the contribution rates of the left tail of the savings distribution; 
those who would save nothing are induced to participate. But in the absence of automatic 
enrollment, many employees would have eventually enrolled at a contribution rate that is at or 
above the match threshold, with an asset allocation that is likely to contain substantial equity 
exposure. If the default contribution rate is below what employees would have chosen without 
automatic enrollment, and if the default asset allocation has a lower expected return than the 
asset allocation that employees would have chosen on their own, then the resulting low 
contribution rates and expected asset returns may outweigh the acceleration of participation 
under automatic enrollment, depressing the rate of asset accumulation.
9 In the long term, these 
employees may actually be worse off as a result of automatic enrollment.  
 
Whether automatic enrollment reduces asset accumulation depends on the defaults 
adopted by employers. Many employers have historically chosen defaults—low contribution 
rates and conservative default funds—that could work against long-run asset accumulation. This 
possibility provides the rationale for two of the other key autosave components of PPA: the 
adoption of contribution escalation as part of the non-discrimination testing safe harbor, and the 
qualified default investment alternative (QDIA) guidelines. 
 
  Although the PPA non-discrimination testing exemption allows for a fixed default 
contribution rate of 6% or higher, the baseline specified in the legislation is automatic enrollment 
with a lower initial default contribution rate of 3% in conjunction with contribution escalation— 
specifically, automatic annual contribution rate increases of 1% continuing until participants 
have reached at least a 6% contribution rate, but no more than a 10% contribution rate. 
 
  Thaler and Benartzi (2004) document the effectiveness of contribution escalation at 
increasing employee savings rates. At the firm they study, employees who opted into an 
automatic annual 3 percentage point contribution increase saw their average contribution rate 
increase almost four-fold over the course of four years, from 3.5% of pay to 13.5% of pay. In 
contrast, employees who did not elect contribution escalation increased their average 
contribution rate by much less over the same time period, from 5.3% to 7.5%. Interestingly, the 
latter group started out saving much more than those who opted into contribution escalation, but 
their relative positions were reversed four years later. As might be expected given the evidence 
on automatic enrollment, contribution escalation is much more effective if it is the default, 
harnessing employee inertia to increase contribution rates. In firms where contribution escalation 
is an option but is not the default, about 25% of savings plan participants sign up; in contrast, 
                                                 
9 Of course, lower expected asset returns may be acceptable or even desirable if they are associated with less risk. 
However, standard economic theory suggests that individuals should be willing to accept at least some stock market 
risk, so that some exposure to the higher expected return of equities is attractive from a normative standpoint. 
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participants are subject to future automatic contribution increases (Benartzi, Peleg, and Thaler, 
2007). 
 
  Combining automatic enrollment with contribution escalation mitigates the drag on long-
term asset accumulation that results under automatic enrollment with a low default contribution 
rate. However, picking a higher initial default contribution rate is also an option (with or without 
contribution escalation). Relative to the PPA benchmark (3% initial contribution rate with 
contribution escalation), picking a higher initial contribution rate with contribution escalation 
will lead to the greatest level of asset accumulation, provided that it does not result in 
significantly higher opt-out rates. Picking a higher initial contribution rate without contribution 
escalation will lead to higher asset accumulation than the PPA baseline in the short run, but may 
result in lower asset accumulation in the long run. 
 
  As with contribution escalation, the qualified default investment alternative (QDIA) 
guidelines also mitigate the potential drag on long-term asset accumulation under automatic 
enrollment. In this case, the pertinent issue is the lower expected investment returns that 
accompany a conservative default fund. The rationale employers have given for selecting such 
conservative defaults has been a desire to forestall participant lawsuits if the default fund 
declines in value; by choosing a default fund designed to preserve principal, this risk is 
minimized (if not eliminated). PPA diminishes this rationale by shielding plan sponsors from 
legal liability if the default fund they choose satisfies certain conditions, including diversification 
(which precludes using a single asset, such as employer stock, as a QDIA default) and exposure 
to both equity and fixed income assets.  
 
Moving from Research to Policy 
 
  The discussion above describes the evidence behind and rationale for the autosave and 
QDIA regulations that are part of PPA. Another important part of the story, however, is how the 
provisions came to be actually incorporated into law. 
 
  McDonald’s is commonly cited as the first company to have incorporated automatic 
enrollment in its 401(k) plan, starting in 1984.
10 By the mid-1990s, a handful of other companies 
had also adopted automatic enrollment. The oft-cited motivation for doing so was to increase 
participation rates among lower-paid employees so that the firm’s savings plan would pass the 
non-discrimination tests and maintain its tax-qualified status. There were some questions, 
however, about the permissibility of automatic enrollment. Could employers legally direct 
employee contributions to an employer-sponsored savings plan without the affirmative consent 
of employees, and could the absence of a “negative election” (that is, opting out) under 
automatic enrollment be construed as approval to make such contributions? 
 
  In 1997, a curious Treasury Department staffer requested an IRS decision on the 
permissibility of 401(k) automatic enrollment. The staffer’s request was initially denied; 
investing scarce resources for the legal comfort of a few companies that had not formally 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, McDonald’s abandoned automatic enrollment in 2002, just as it was gaining popularity among other 
employers. 
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Benefits Tax Counsel at the Treasury Department, to recognize that automatic enrollment had the 
potential to increase savings and improve retirement security for millions of Americans. An 
affirmative ruling on the permissibility of automatic enrollment might lead to more widespread 
adoption. So in 1998, Treasury/IRS issued Revenue Ruling 98-30, which described an acceptable 
scenario for 401(k) automatic enrollment.  
 
In contrast to private rulings, which are issued in response to directed questions by 
private parties, revenue rulings are more general. The scenario in Ruling 98-30 involved a 
hypothetical company using automatic enrollment with a 3% default contribution rate invested in 
a balanced fund and an employer match that was not directed into employer stock. These 
seemingly ancillary details about the employer match were chosen quite purposefully. Mark Iwry 
and the staff at Treasury had two concerns about automatic enrollment. First, they were worried 
that firms might substitute automatic enrollment for an employer match as a way to satisfy the 
non-discrimination rules, a move that could nullify or even reverse the savings increases that 
might otherwise occur under automatic enrollment. Second, they were worried that employers 
might use automatic enrollment to funnel 401(k) contributions into employer stock in order to 
inflate its price. For firms interested in implementing automatic enrollment with the blessing of 
the IRS, the safest course of action would be to emulate the ruling’s example precisely—that is, 
with the provision of an employer match that was not directed into employer stock. 
 
  This initial ruling was followed by a June 1998 speech by President Bill Clinton in which 
he endorsed automatic enrollment as a mechanism for increasing savings; then Treasury 
Secretary Lawrence Summers also encouraged employer adopted of automatic enrollment in 
some of his public remarks. Despite a belief within Treasury that automatic enrollment should be 
heavily endorsed, there were concerns that moving too quickly could backfire politically. 
Automatic enrollment could be perceived as being overtly paternalistic or yet another 
burdensome employer obligation. Either of these outcomes could result in Congressional action 
to block 401(k) automatic enrollment programs. Thus, Treasury/IRS began issuing a series of 
successively more expansive rulings meant to illustrate the different types of plans and automatic 
enrollment schemes deemed acceptable. The hope was that this gradual expansion would nudge 
employers toward automatic enrollment schemes with desirable features without stirring up too 
much political controversy. 
 
  These actions by Treasury coincided with the emergence of the first research findings on 
how automatic enrollment and contribution escalation affect savings outcomes. Although 
Treasury officials had worried about automatic enrollment displacing employer matches and 
being used to direct savings plan assets into employer stock, neither of these fears seemed to 
have been realized in practice. The biggest drawback to automatic enrollment was one that had 
not been anticipated: the persistence of the default options chosen by employers. As discussed 
previously, low default contribution rates reduce the contribution rates of individuals in the right 
tail of the savings distribution, and individuals do not quickly move away from these low 
defaults. Thus, 401(k) automatic enrollment could have a neutral or even negative net effect on 
aggregate retirement asset accumulation. Similarly, if employers adopted conservative default 
funds with expected returns below that of the assets employees would otherwise choose for 
themselves, account balances would grow more slowly in expectation. 
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Although all the revenue rulings issued by IRS/Treasury used a balanced fund as the 
default investment option, most early adopters of automatic enrollment opted for much more 
conservative money market or stable value default funds. Employers were concerned that a 
default fund which declined in value could give rise to a participant class-action lawsuit. 
Treasury could do little more on this front given that its existing revenue rulings already 
specified more aggressive defaults (balanced funds). But Treasury could encourage higher initial 
default contribution rates and contribution escalation. One of the revenue rulings in 2000 
specified a 4% default contribution rate, in contrast to the 3% default rate specified in earlier 
rulings. This was followed in 2004 by an IRS general information letter
11 which clarified that 
employers have substantial discretion in structuring default contributions under automatic 
enrollment, including default contribution rates that are higher (or lower) than those used in 
previous revenue rulings, default contribution rates that are higher (or lower) than the employer 
match threshold, and default contribution rates that increase over time—that is, automatic 
contribution escalation. 
 
As the results of the academic research began to diffuse, automatic enrollment and 
contribution escalation gained traction with employers, savings plan administrators, and benefits 
consultants. The staunchest opponents were those who felt that automatic enrollment and 
contribution escalation were too paternalistic. But these concerns were largely allayed by the 
argument that with or without automatic enrollment and contribution escalation, a company 
savings plan has a default; the question is simply what that default should be.  
 
The discomfort some employers felt in adopting automatic enrollment was not entirely 
philosophical. There were several legal issues that made many employers reluctant to adopt so-
called autopilot savings plans. Some did not feel adequately shielded from state laws that 
prohibit employers from withholding money from an employee’s paycheck without consent. 
Other companies were concerned about potential legal liability associated with choosing a 
default fund that would likely hold a significant fraction of the plan’s assets going forward. Still 
others were concerned about the tax implications of automatic enrollment for employees who did 
not want to participate in the savings plan but who did not opt out of participation before the opt-
out deadline. These employees would incur a 10% tax penalty if they tried to recover the 
contributions they had made inadvertently. Congressional action was required to address these 
concerns. 
 
Peter Orszag and Mark Iwry of The Retirement Security Project took the lead in 
incorporating into the Pension Protection Act provisions that would encourage employers to 
adopt automatic enrollment and contribution escalation (including clearing out the legal 
underbrush mentioned above) and in pushing the legislation through Congress. They were helped 
by groups such as the Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (representing the interests of 
employers), AARP (representing the interests of older individuals), and the non-partisan 
Employee Benefit Research Institute. The sell was not a difficult one; most of the key political 
constituencies were quickly convinced that automatic enrollment was aligned with their own 
interests. Employee support for automatic enrollment was widespread, leading to the backing of 
                                                 
11 A general information letter is a device used by the IRS when a ruling does not seem necessary because a point is 
sufficiently obvious but may require clarification. 
  10labor unions.
12 Employers were generally in favor; the proposed legislation would grant relief 
from legal liability for investment losses in qualifying default funds, and it would also grant 
relief from non-discrimination testing to employers that adopted sufficiently generous forms of 
automatic enrollment. Employers were also not required to adopt automatic enrollment if they 
did not want to. The financial sector recognized that automatic enrollment and contribution 
escalation would increase assets that they would manage. The failure of Social Security reform 
spurred an interest in promoting increased private savings among both conservatives and liberals, 
and although liberals were generally more inclined to support strengthening traditional defined 
benefit pension schemes, they were swayed by the evidence that automatic enrollment had the 
largest beneficial impact on the savings outcomes of lower-income individuals and minority 
groups. In the words of Peter Orszag, automatic enrollment “had become like apple pie on 
Capitol Hill—everyone was for it.”
13
 
  Orszag attributes the success of the autosave features in the Pension Protection Act to 
three factors.
14 First, there was clear and compelling evidence that automatic enrollment was an 
effective means of increasing savings and improving economic wellbeing, particularly of 
minorities and of the poor. The evidence and the theory behind automatic enrollment and 
contribution escalation were transparent and convincing. Second, the results of the economic 
research on the isolated adoption of automatic enrollment and contribution escalation were 
clearly scalable and conformed to intuition and to experience. Third, as noted above, the effects 
of automatic enrollment appealed to both sides of the political aisle. 
 
  The U.S. is not the only country to recognize the impact that automatic enrollment can 
have on savings outcomes. In New Zealand, the KiwiSaver Act adopted in 2006 creates a new 
national program based on automatic enrollment to supplement the existing superannuation 
scheme. On the other side of the Atlantic, the United Kingdom’s Pensions Act of 2007 also 
incorporates automatic enrollment as part of its pension system reforms. Although it is too early 
to determine the efficacy of these programs, widespread take-up of 401(k) automatic enrollment 
in the United States is encouraging, inspiring Orszag to declare the autosave features of the 
Pension Protection Act “a stunning example of the success of behavioral economics in affecting 
public policy.”
15
                                                 
12 See Harris Interactive (2007) for evidence on widespread employee support of automatic enrollment. 
13 Interview with Peter Orszag, July 3, 2007. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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  13FIGURE 1. Automatic Enrollment for New Hires and 
Savings Plan Participation: Company A
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Figure 2. Distribution of 401(k) Contribution Rates for 
Employees Aged 40+ at Hire: Company D
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  14Figure 3. Fraction of Participants Hired During Automatic 
Enrollment at the Automatic Enrollment Defaults
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